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ABSTRACT This response argues that Greenspan’s comment is basically incoherent, and that
the position taken by Leicester and Cooke has unacceptable practical consequences. Greenspan
admits that many people with ‘mental retardation’ lack adult decision-making capacities, but
at the same time assumes that they have these very capacities in assigning them freedom rights.
Leicester and Cooke consistently argue that people with ‘mental retardation’ do have adult
reasoning powers and therefore should be given freedom rights. But this position has the rather
disquieting implication that both the practice of treating ‘mental retardation’ as an exempting
condition and the practice of giving them important special welfare rights seem to loose their
justi cation.
In a response that should be brief it is impossible to discuss all the objections raised
in the comments of Greenspan and Leicester and Cooke. We shall focus on what we
see as the central subject under discussion: should people with “mental retardation”
have the freedom to lead their own sex lives as they see  t or is some form of
speci ed paternalistic supervision morally justi ed? Before going into that question,
however, we would like to address, very brie y, two unrelated matters.
The  rst is that we had some dif culties with isolating relevant and substantial
arguments in Greenspan’s overly indignant and sometimes quite insinuating
response. Not only is he often misrepresenting our claims (we are not defending the
view that “people with mental retardation are, essentially, perpetual children”, nor
do we acknowledge that our policy would work only in settings where there is “daily,
if not constant, supervision”—just to mention two examples); he is also trying to
convince the reader by playing the man instead of the ball (no wonder, they do not
have “real friendships … with people with mental retardation”, and they are coming
from a country that is “lagging behind other western nations”—not to mention other
arguments ad hominem). And, what is worse, he is disparaging our view by associat-
ing it with expressions and practices that evoke strong negative feelings but actually
have nothing to do with the claims we make (care professionals will become “sexual
ISSN 0305-7240 print; ISSN 1465-3877 online/02/020189-06
Ó 2002 Journal of Moral Education Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/03057240220143296
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
17
:0
0 
12
 J
un
e 
20
11
190 J. Steutel & B. Spiecker
police of cers”, people with mental retardation are regarded as “a subspecies of
human beings”, there are historical links with “eugenic practices”, and so on). If we
put all this in parentheses, as we should do in a philosophical or scienti c discourse,
what is left are a few arguments that are relevant but  awed and even incoherent, as
we shall argue below.
The second, very different, issue we would like to touch upon concerns
terminology. The question of which term is the proper one for referring to the group
of people we want to discuss, and also the related question of how the status of the
corresponding concept should be interpreted, are important and complicated. Here
we simply want to make the following observations. By far the greatest number of
subscribers to the Journal of Moral Education is located in North America. In that
part of the world the term “people with mental retardation” is the common and
prevailing one, as may be deduced from the name of the largest and most important
US organisation for researchers and care professionals (American Association on
Mental Retardation), as well as from the titles of the periodicals published by the
organisation, which are among the most respected and in uential in the  eld
(American Journal of Mental Retardation and Mental Retardation).
According to Leicester and Cooke, the term “intellectual disabilities” has been
adopted internationally. Greenspan points out that the AAMR has already initiated
the process of jettisoning the term “mental retardation”, probably in favour of
“intellectual disabilities”. But a brief look at the website of the AAMR
(www.aamr.org) is enough to ascertain that the term “mental retardation” is still the
standard one and is used without any perceivable reservation. In the recent
report of the ad hoc Committee on Terminology and Classi cation of the AAMR,
many issues are discussed but not the use of the term “mental retardation”. Without
further ado it is stated simply that the 2002 proposed system retains the
term “mental retardation” (webpage last updated 17 October 2001). Moreover,
introducing the term “intellectual disabilities” would be dif cult to reconcile with
central elements of the AAMR de nition of “mental retardation”. For many years,
and in our view rightly so, the AAMR has emphasised that intellectual limitations
are not enough for a diagnosis of mental retardation. As well as signi cantly
sub-average intellectual functioning, the existence of limitations in adaptive skills in
two or more skill areas that are central to successful life functioning (such as
self-care, home living, community use and work) is also regarded as a necessary
condition. This central characteristic is not re ected in the term “intellectual
disabilities”.
The combination of the fact that by far the largest group of JME subscribers is
domiciled in North America, and the fact that “mental retardation” is the standard
term in that part of the world, has been for us an important reason for using it in
our article. An additional reason has been that alternative expressions, such as
“learning disabilities” and “learning dif culties” are not only, and often not at all,
associated with people with mental retardation. In the United Kingdom the term
“learning disabilities” is nowadays used widely to refer to people with mental
retardation, although it is striking that in last year’s volume of the British Journal of
Developmental Disabilities the term “mental retardation” is still used frequently,
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including in the titles of articles. But even in the United Kingdom the term also
covers quite different groups, as may be deduced from the last year’s special issue
of the Journal of Moral Education (30:3, 2001). In the United States and many
other countries, including the Netherlands, the term “learning disabilities” is
not used to refer to the class of people with mental retardation at all. For example,
the ad hoc Committee on Terminology and Classi cation of the AAMR considers
those diagnosed with learning disabilities and developmental disabilities as “other
populations”.
Let us move on to the more substantial differences between our views and those
of Greenspan and Leicester and Cooke. Their principal objection to our point of
view is that it morally legitimates paternalistic interventions into the lives of people
with mental retardation. To them any form of paternalism towards (chronological)
adults with mental retardation, including any form of paternalism with regard to
their sex life, is morally wrong if not morally despicable. Correspondingly, they see
our views as a threat to the freedom rights of people with mental retardation, or at
any rate to their right of self-determination in the sexual sphere.
Our opponents are right in stating that the view we defended implies some form
of paternalism towards people with mental retardation, and therefore also some
restrictions of their freedom to arrange their sex life according to their own prefer-
ences. We argued that applying the liberal principle of mutual consent to sexual
interactions between people with mental retardation has unacceptable conse-
quences. According to this moral principle, anything sexual goes as long as it is done
with the valid consent of the people involved. Valid consent roughly means consent
that is not coerced but freely given, that is not the result of deceit but based on
relevant and adequate information, and that is given by people with deliberative
capacities that are typical of adults, in the status meaning of that term. In our view,
people with mental retardation who are able to participate in sexual interactions are
often lacking the powers of practical reasoning required for valid consent. On the
basis of the principle of mutual consent, such forms of sex should therefore be
considered morally impermissible. We believe, however, that many forms of sexual
interaction between people with mental retardation are morally legitimate and often
indeed morally desirable. Because we could not accept the implication of the
principle of mutual consent indicated, we tried to articulate a principle that is even
more liberal, in the sense of morally allowing particular forms of sex that do not
meet the criterion of valid consent. This principle mentions several conditions of
morally permissible sex between people with mental retardation who lack the
deliberative capacities required for valid consent. The most important are that the
sex is wanted or preferred by the people themselves and that caregivers who meet
particular criteria have given their additional consent. The  rst condition, the fact
that the people involved do desire the sexual interaction, is not enough for making
the sex morally permissible. Because the people do not have the required adult
capacities of practical reasoning, their preference cannot be regarded as a form of
valid consent and should therefore be complemented with the consent of adult
carers.
The moral principle we defended does indeed imply some form of limited
paternalism. According to the second condition, care providers should not give their
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consent if, after due re ection, they have good reasons to assume that the sexual
interaction will be detrimental to the interests or long-term welfare of the people
with mental retardation. In that process of re ection the preferences of the persons
with mental retardation will obviously weigh heavily, but a con ict between these
preferences and the considered judgement of the caregiver cannot be excluded. In
such cases, we argued, the carer’s judgement should be given moral priority.
This speci ed form of paternalism implies that people with mental retardation
who are not capable of giving valid consent cannot be assigned the freedom right to
arrange their sex life according to their own preferences. Freedom rights or rights of
self-determination are often contrasted with so-called welfare rights. A welfare right
is one which entails a positive duty, that is, a duty of others to do certain things, in
this case the duty to provide or maintain certain bene ts. But a freedom right merely
entails a negative duty, that is, a duty of others not to do certain things, in this case
the duty not to interfere with or render impossible the action or practice to which
the person is being said to have a right. Because we believe that interference of carers
is morally legitimate under the speci ed circumstances, we reject the view that they
have such a negative duty with respect to the sex life of people with mental
retardation who lack adult reasoning abilities. Contrary to what is suggested by
Greenspan, we do not deny that such people have welfare rights in the domain of
sexuality. Our  rm conviction is that they do have a welfare right that entails the
positive duty of care providers to give them the support they need if they want to
have sex that is in their best interests. For the very reason that they should be denied
a sexual right of self-determination, they have a welfare right that entails the positive
duty of caregivers to help them in determining which form of sex would serve those
interests.
Obviously an important assumption of our argument is that there are people
with mental retardation who are capable of entering into sexual interactions without
having the capacities required for giving valid consent. In our original article we
made the claim that people who are moderately mentally retarded, and also people
with mild mental retardation in relatively complex situations, do actually meet these
criteria; but we admitted that the line between people with mental retardation who
meet the criteria and those who do not is vague and could be drawn differently.
Leicester and Cooke, however, deny that such a line can be drawn at all, as they
contend that people described as having mild or moderate mental retardation can
and do give valid consent. Perfectly consistent with this view, they believe that these
people should be ascribed the right to arrange their sex life according to their own
choices. What is striking is that Greenspan takes the position that people with
mental retardation should have the right of self-determination in matters of sexu-
ality, without rejecting the view that many of them are unable to give their valid
consent. With regard to people with mild and moderate mental retardation, he
claims that in almost any  eld of practical functioning “one will  nd a signi cant
minority, sometimes a sizable minority, who clearly fall in the normal adult range in
terms of both outcome success and decision processes used”. This claim, which is
based on the results of empirical research, implies logically that a substantial
majority of people with mild or moderate mental retardation do not have adult
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decision-making capacities. Perhaps he draws the line somewhat differently than we
did, but he, too, acknowledges that a substantial group of people who are diagnosed
as mildly or moderately mentally retarded lacks the capacities for giving valid
consent. Why, then, give the members of this group the right to sexual freedom?
Contrary to claiming a welfare right, which presupposes only that the right-holder
has certain interests that can be protected or promoted, claiming a freedom right
presupposes that the right-holder has the mental equipment for exercising that right.
This equipment consists precisely of the capacities of practical rationality involved in
having the status of an adult. So Greenspan claims, on the basis of empirical
research, that many people with mental retardation do not have the adult decision-
making capacities, while at the same time presupposing that they have these very
capacities in assigning them the right of sexual self-determination. This position is,
of course, incoherent.
According to Greenspan, “a major problem with the paternalistic approach to
sex is that it denies people with mental retardation the opportunity to make, and
learn from, their mistakes”; but this observation is unwarranted, at least with respect
to the form of paternalism we defended. The moral principle we proposed prescribes
that the caregiver should consider carefully whether or not being involved in some
form of sexual interaction will serve the best interests or long-term welfare of the
people concerned. Why could not the caregiver come to the conclusion that some
form of wanted sex does meet this criterion, even though the carer knows that having
the sex will turn out to be a somewhat dramatic experience for the participants?
Indeed, the reason why the caregiver is consenting may be precisely that such a
learning experience will serve their long-term welfare. Moreover, we should not
confuse the freedom or opportunity of people to make and learn from their mistakes
with their right to freedom. Any justi cation of giving people freedom rights seems
to exclude paternalistic considerations, but it is hard to conceive how giving people
the freedom to make their own mistakes and to learn from them could be justi ed
but from paternalistic reasons. Consequently, giving people with mental retardation
this kind of freedom and at the same time rejecting any form of paternalism towards
them, is an incoherent position.
Unlike Greenspan, Leicester and Cooke defend the view that people with mild
and moderate mental retardation do have the capacities required for giving valid
consent; but is their view tenable? Leicester and Cooke argue that our claims are
based on an empirical mistake, but they do not support this point of criticism by
presenting any results of empirical research. The empirical research Greenspan
refers to seems to corroborate our view rather than theirs. Moreover, with regard to
“the most vulnerable adults in our society”, they argue in favour of an “assumption
of freedom within a framework of protection”. We have dif culties in determining
how such a framework might be maintained without any paternalistic supervision of
caregivers. But our main objection to their position is that it implies ways of dealing
with people with mental retardation that are, in our view, morally unacceptable.
To begin with, in claiming that people with mild or moderate mental retar-
dation should be assigned the right of self-determination because they do have the
adult powers of practical reasoning, one commits oneself to the view that they are
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fully responsible for what they do. Holding someone fully accountable presupposes
that the person is seen as having the capacities of practical rationality that are
constitutive of adulthood. So if one makes the claim that people with mild or
moderate mental retardation do in fact possess these capacities, one is no longer in
the position to present their mental condition as an exempting condition. We have
great dif culy in accepting this implication of Leicester’s and Cooke’s view, as may
be illustrated by a dramatic example. Two pages of the website of the AAMR are
directed against the death penalty of people with mental retardation. According to
the AAMR, “the death penalty is disproportionate to the level of culpability possible
for people with mental retardation”. More generally, the claim is made that “mental
retardation should always be considered to be a mitigating circumstance in selecting
an appropriate punishment for a serious offence”. The reason for taking these views
is that “mental retardation is a substantially disabling condition which may affect an
individual’s ability to appreciate and understand fully the consequences of actions”.
In other words, because people with mental retardation “have poor understanding
of cause/effect and of the consequences of their actions”, they cannot be held fully
responsible for what they do.
Another implication of giving people with mental retardation equal rights to
self-determination seems to be that many forms of desirable support will lose their
justi cation. It is generally seen as justi ed that people with mental retardation have
welfare rights which entail positive duties of others, including the government, to
ensure that they receive the necessary support. One of the major reasons for giving
them such special rights is that their powers of practical reasoning are impaired. For
example, the AAMR explicitly connects forms of support and services to particular
limitations in adaptive skills related to the areas mentioned above. These adaptive
skill limitations, which can all be regarded as limitations in practical rationality,
function as justifying reasons for giving them the required support. However, the
claim that people with mental retardation should be given special welfare rights is
dif cult to combine with the claim that they should have equal freedom rights. For
part of the justi catory basis for giving them the welfare rights indicated is the fact
that they lack the capacities required for giving them freedom rights.
Correspondence: Dr Jan Steutel and Dr Ben Spiecker, Department of Philosophy
and History of Education, Vrije Universiteit, Van der Boechorststraat 1, 1081
BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands; E-mail: JW.Steutel@psy.vu.nl or B.Spiecker@
psy.vu.nl
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